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Abstract. The case study analyzed in the report involves the behavioral specification and 
verification of a three-stage pipeline consisting of mutually concurrent modules which also 
compete for a shared resource. The system components are specified in terms of Concurrent 
State Machines (CSM) and the verification technique used is the temporal model checking in 
the COSMA environment.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the design of many types of systems (e.g. for measurement, DSP, data acquisition, 
distributed control)  one of often encountered problems is to guarantee the correct cooperation 
among system components, especially if the system operation involves the use of shared 
hardware/software resources, like a common memory, buffers between modules, real-time 
databases, shared hardware units and/or data/control communication paths.  
Usually, it is assumed that the given distributed applications run on top of some operating 
system or other (more or less sophisticated) control mechanism (e.g. DB management system, 
lower-layer communication protocol, transaction control, bus arbitration unit or even the 
whole Java virtual machine) which by itself somehow manages the problem. This provides the 
designer with a illusion of safety. However, these mechanisms certainly protect the 
underlying shared resource against the improper use but do not deal with the proper behavior 
of applications themselves which call for these resources. Moreover, especially in the case of 
dedicated real-time systems, the designer often has to implement his/her own low-level 
system procedures, e.g. for processing interrupts, granting the access to common DMA 
channels or to real-time databases which (due to the performance requirements) are 
implemented as RAM arrays rather than as the large relational or OO databases with full-scale 
transaction control.  
This can be a potential source of errors which are extremely hard to discover, identify and 
correct. Debugging and testing procedures typically applicable to programs do not help much. 
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Even the carefully developed functional tests are usually designed to determine whether the 
system actually does what it should do. They do not answer the question if the system 
eventually does something it shouldn’t (get deadlocked, for instance). What still worse, the 
co-operation and synchronization errors are highly nondeterministic by their nature. They 
occur as a result of the rare sequences or coincidences of events and are hardly predictable. 
Therefore, neither testing procedures nor the long-lasting simulated or actual execution of 
a system do not guarantee that these errors would manifest themselves just during the 
runtime. Apparently, some other approach is needed to protect the system (and its designer) 
against this type of design errors. 
There is a formal procedure that can help, namely the model checking [1, 2, 6, 12]. This 
methodology faces the growing interest in today’s computer science and technology. The 
present paper is aimed to show how model checking techniques, implemented in the COSMA 
3.0 software environment, can support the design of concurrent, reactive systems.  
The case study for the experiments discussed below came from an industrial real-time data 
acquisition system called PowerWatch, designed and implemented in the Institute of 
Computer Science, WUT, for the purpose of monitoring and management of power plants. 
Actually, the system now works 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in five plants throughout 
Poland. At some stage of system development and upgrade, the decision was made to 
implement the messaging subsystem (SigEvent), schematically shown in Fig. 1. Its purpose is 
to notify the plant’s staff members about events that eventually occur and call for their urgent 
presence in plant’s premises.  
Events that need for such an action are detected in an Event Detector from the stream of 
data provided by SigData, which is generally responsible for the data acquisition in the whole 
installation.  Then, Event Filter decides to whom (and what) a message has to be sent. The 
Message Handler controls the process of sending the messages.   
A closer look on Message Handler reveals soon that it should consists of three modules, 
corresponding to consecutive phases of processing each message is subject to (ordering 
messages, routing, channel control). So, the Message Handler should be designed as pipeline 
Fig. 1. The idea of messaging subsystem in PowerWatch 
Jerzy Mieścicki, Bogdan Czejdo and Wiktor B. Daszczuk 
of three modules that provide the smooth and reliable flow of messages from the event filter 
down to an end user. The number of pipeline stages or modules may vary, but this general 
functional scheme seems to be typical for a very broad class of applications.  
In order to show how model checking methodology developed in the COSMA project can 
support the design process, the above-mentioned case study was generalized to a system 
shown in Fig. 2. For the sake of readability, the unnecessary details of PowerWatch system 
are omitted and the functional requirements are simplified so that the specification of 
components can be illustrated with understandable graphs.  
Now, the system under consideration is the pipeline of three processing stages or modules 
with data source and data sink at two ends of the pipeline. Each module provides the 
appropriate processing for each data frame it receives from its left-hand neighbor and passes 
the data to the next (right-hand) one. Additionally, it is assumed that two modules (Module_1 
and Module_3) in order to perform their processing, have to use a shared resource, to which 
the access is mutually exclusive. The functional unit which provides this mutually exclusive 
access is modeled by the Arbiter. To make things still more complex (and realistic), the 
Arbiter deals not only with the two modules of ‘our’ pipeline, but also with other partners 
(unspecified in more details) which also compete for the common resource.  
We show below how these design requirements can be precisely modeled using the 
Concurrent State Machines (CSM) which are the conceptual framework for the COSMA 
methodology [27]. The CSM behavioral specification of individual system components is 
very close to designer’s intuition and – to an extent – resembles commonly known UML’s 
state diagrams, statecharts of other finite-state behavioral models. However, in contrast to 
state diagrams (as well as sequence or cooperation diagrams) CSM are formally precise 
enough to enable the algorithmic computation of the large graph, showing all system’s 
reachable states and transitions among them. This graph is a global behavioral model of the 
system and contains all its possible executions.  The exhaustive search in the system graph for 
properties specified as the design requirements is just what the model checking is about. As it 
can be expected, the main challenge for this methodology is the size of the graph and the 
complexity of model checking algorithms.  
Fig. 2. Flow of data in a three-module pipeline with a shared resource 
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2 BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MODEL CHECKING AND CONCURRENT STATE 
MACHINES 
2.1  Model checking 
Model checking is a formal method for the verification of systems’ behavior. Generally, 
formal methods for this purpose can be divided into two main groups: theorem proving and 
finite-state methods
 
[3]. Among the latter ones, model checking enjoys the greatest interest. 
In the theorem-proving, a question if a given property holds for a given system is expressed as 
a formal theorem which has to be mathematically proved either true or false. The way how to 
do it must be devised (almost) each time anew, therefore the verification (even if supported by 
tools like PVS [15], Larch [17], or HOL [16], see also [9]), requires a sound theoretical 
background, intuition and formal skills from the designer. It is probably why the theorem 
proving (however universal and mathematically elegant this approach is) enjoys only 
a limited interest in practice.  
In contrast to theorem proving, model checking offers the designer a still-growing set of 
ready-to-use algorithms and techniques for the analysis of system’s properties. So, it is 
potentially more acceptable from practitioners’ point of view. Generally, the approach 
consists in the following. First, out of some primary specification of system components (e.g. 
programs or some program-like notation, Z notation, state diagrams or other finite-state 
graphs etc.) one has to build a large but finite graph containing all possible (reachable) system 
states and all possible transitions among them. This graph makes the (finite-state) behavioral 
model of a system. Each path in the graph represents the allowable execution or the (part of) 
behavior of a system. The graph contains all possible executions or behaviors. Also, the 
property in question has to be specified. In a temporal model checking the property is 
specified as a temporal expression, i.e. the formula involving temporal operators (‘always’, 
‘eventually’, ‘until’, ‘next’) in addition to Boolean ones (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’) and the quantifiers 
(‘in all paths starting from state x’, ‘there exists a path starting from x such that …’). Then, 
given the system model and the property, the exhaustive search of the system’s state graph is 
performed, aimed to decide whether the desired property holds or not. 
As the model (graph) is finite, the problem is decidable. It can be algorithmized so that the 
designer is offered a repertoire of functions designed for the analysis of numerous aspects of 
system’s behavior. Moreover, if the property does not hold, one can obtain a counterexample, 
i.e. the path leading to the just-identified failure. This provides the extremely valuable feed-
back information enabling the designer to identify and correct the component which is 
responsible for a negative outcome of the checking.  
The main limitation the model checking is confronted with is the exponential explosion of 
the state space size. Indeed, even for a relatively small system of, say, 10 components 
(10 states each), a set of all possible states can be of order of 10
10
. Even though not all these 
states are actually reachable (due to synchronization constraints among components), the 
exponential nature of the system graph size has been always considered a serious limitation 
for finite state methods. Breakthrough came in early 1980’s with the use of Reduced Ordered 
Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDD [4, 5]) and the idea of symbolic model checking [6, 12]. 
ROBDD enable the convenient representation of very large graphs while the symbolic model 
checking allows to reduce the computational effort needed for the evaluation of temporal 
formulas in a given graph. Soon, model checking became a practical technique for the 
verification of industrial hardware projects, protocols and software [7, 8, 2]. Nevertheless, the 
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exponential growth of state space is still a real threat. An extensive research is being done on 
various techniques that can manage the problem.  
There are numerous software tools (or model checkers) available for these purposes. 
Among the most frequently referenced ones are SPIN [10, 11], SMV [12, 13], Cospan  (or its 
commercial version, FormalCheck [14]). A few dozen of other tools have been implemented 
for research purposes [3]. COSMA, the software environment used in this paper, is one of 
them [18]. It is based on the idea of Concurrent State Machines (CSM), the finite-state model 
particularly suitable for the modeling the cooperation and communication among the 
components of concurrent reactive systems, as well as between the system and its 
environment. Since the beginning of the idea itself ([19, 20]) the CSM approach has been 
tested in several studies ([21, 22, 23]) and the implementation of the COSMA software tool 
was undertaken. Its recent upgrade (COSMA 3.0, now under testing) supports structured 
specification of components and a powerful reduction technique which was also used in 
a case study discussed in the present paper ([29,30]).   
Concurrent State Machines support in a unique way two aspects of concurrency: 
simultaneous occurrence of communication events (formally – symbols of the input alphabet) 
and simultaneous execution of component actions. No special mechanism for interleaving 
actions or sequencing the input is assumed. The system of CSM performs as if it was 
embedded in a communication medium which instantaneously and faultlessly broadcasts to 
all system components the union of output symbols produced by the environment and 
components themselves. However, the delays, nondeterministic loss of symbols, (finite) 
buffers as well as specific sender – receiver pairs (instead of broadcast-mode communication) 
can be also modeled, but as a deliberate designer’s decision rather than as an implicit general 
assumption. The advantage of the CSM model is that the product of the system (or the large 
graph representing the possible system behaviors) is relatively simple to obtain (using the 
state-of-the-art BDD library) and makes an almost ready-for-use Kripke structure needed for 
the purposes of temporal model checking [25].  
Also, the extended version of CSM model (ECSM) [26] is studied and implemented in the 
COSMA environment. It allows for defining local and global variables and attributing actions 
(practically – sequential programs) to states and transitions of the finite-state CSM models of 
components. This supports the design of complex software: first, the correctness of the 
communication and cooperation among components (viewed as CSM models) is verified by 
model checking, then - as the ‘communication skeleton’ of the system is proven correct - the 
‘real’ data structures and actions over them are added. The ultimate goal is to obtain an 
executable code from the ECSM specification. 
2.2 Concurrent State Machines 
The modeled system Z is a nonempty, finite set of components, written Z = {m1, m2, …, 
mk}. Each mi is a (finite state) Concurrent State Machine or CSM. To define the CSM, one has 
to specify its graph and indicate one of graph nodes as an initial node. Graphs used for the 
definition of CSM are referred to below as COSMA Labeled Graphs or CLG. 
At the stage of specification, CLG themselves can be viewed as just graphs: collections of 
nodes, arrows and labels attributed to them. We can edit them, e.g. add or delete nodes and 
edges or modify the labels attributed to elements of the graph. Also, we can define the more 
complex operations over CLG graphs: e.g. 'stitching' two unconnected graphs into one graph 
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(by adding some 'stitching edges' with appropriate labels) or, conversely, cutting a sub-graph 
from a larger graph.  
Only once the specification is completed and we choose one of nodes as the initial node - 
the graph (CLG) becomes the machine (CSM). So, from the same graph we can obtain several 
different machines, by a different choice of the initial node. Similarly, given the collection of 
CSM, we can define and analyze many different systems, indicating which machines make 
the system at the present stage of analysis.  
Example CSM machine is shown in Fig. 3. It is a model of one of components used later 
on, namely Proc_2.  Its CLG graph consists of five nodes (rounded boxes) and a number of 
directed edges or arrows. One node, namely Ni (highlighted with a thicker line) is indicated as 
machine's initial node. Nodes have their identifiers or names, placed in upper part of the box, 
e.g. Ni, Take, Process etc. Like in other labeled transition systems, CLG nodes represent 
states of CSM behavior. At any instant of time, the machine is in exactly one of its states. 
At the beginning of the observable behavior, machine is in its initial state.  
In lower part of the node a set of output symbols (attributed to a given node) is 
enumerated. The machine transmits these symbols whenever it visits the given node. In the 
example from Fig. 3, in node Ni the machine transmits no symbol (or: empty set of symbols), 
in Take the one-element set {getInpQ_2} is transmitted, while in Wait it produces 
{doneProc_2}, etc.  If a set of two or more output symbols is attributed to a node (which is 
not the case for this particular machine), then all these symbols are transmitted 
simultaneously, as long as the machine is in the given state. It is assumed that any symbol 
produced inside the system is produced by only one component, but it can be ‘watched to’ by 
multiple communication partners. This way, we can define pairs or small clusters of 
communicating components, even though in a CSM model (formally) all the symbols are 
immediately broadcasted to all components. 
Directed edges or arrows of a graph are labeled with Boolean formulas. Operators +, *, ! 
stand for Boolean sum, product and complement (respectively). Generally, the formula 
specifies the conditions under which the given edge is enabled. For instance, formula 
stProc_2  (at the arrow from Ni to Take) means that this transition is enabled if (while the 
machine is in Ni) the symbol stProc_2 is received by the machine. Similarly, formula 
!stProc_2  (at the arrow from Ni back to Ni) means that this edge is enabled if (in the same 
state) the symbol stProc_2 is not received, etc. Formula 1 is unconditionally true, therefore 
arrows labeled with it are enabled regardless of machine's input.  
relProc_2
! relProc_2
1
1
1
1stProc_2
! stProc_2
Wait
doneProc_2
Put
putOutQ_2
Process
doProc_2
Take
getInpQ_2
Ni
Fig. 3. CSM model of Proc_2 
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If for a given ('present') state two or more outgoing edges are enabled, then one of them is 
selected as active edge. This choice is nondeterministic and fair, so that if the machine visits 
this particular state infinitely large number of times - each enabled edge is eventually selected 
also infinitely often. Anyway, the edge chosen as active one points out the next state to be 
assumed by the machine.  
It should be emphasized that in the CSM framework only arcs between two different nodes 
are referred to as transitions. The edges that lead from a node back to the same node ('self-
loops' or 'ears', as they are often called in the CSM parlance) are not treated as transitions. 
They mean that the machine, under a condition specified in the formula attributed to an 'ear', 
can remain in a given state. Indeed, no actual ‘transition’ is then executed. Thus, for instance, 
the machine from Fig. 3 remains in Ni if stProc_2 does not come. If stProc_2 comes - the 
transition to Take is executed. Transitions are instantaneous, i.e. they take no time. 
Transitions labeled with 1 are called spontaneous transitions. For instance, entering Take 
state the machine produces output symbol getInpQ_2, then immediately and spontaneously 
performs the transition to Process. The behavior in Process is more complex: it involves both 
nondeterminism and spontaneity. For this state, two outgoing edges are unconditionally 
enabled, so the machine faces the nondeterministic choice: to remain in the present state or to 
perform the transition to Put. The above-mentioned fairness condition guarantees that the 
transition to the next state is eventually (spontaneously) performed. Practically, it means that 
the machine remains in Process for arbitrarily long but finite time. The described mechanism 
is often used for the representation of the flow of time. In the CSM model (at least by now) 
there are no means that would provide for the specification of absolute lengths of time 
intervals: they are introduced only for Extended CSM [26].  
To sum up, the example Proc_2 performs as follows. Initially, it is in its Ni state, watching 
only for starting symbol (signal, message, event) stProc_2 to come (this event is produced by 
Main_2). When it eventually happens, Proc_2 spontaneously goes through a sequence of 
states, where it gets the data from module’s input queue, processes it (spending some time in 
Process state), puts the result into module’s output queue and notifies the Main_2 process 
(issuing the doneProc_2 event) that it has just performed its job. When released by Main_2, 
it returns back to its initial, idle state and waits to be started again by Main_2.     
In the CSM framework it is assumed that all the components that make the system are 
embedded in the common, ideal communication medium which instantaneously (and 
faultlessly) broadcasts the set union of all symbols transmitted by all the components as well 
as symbols coming to the system from the environment. In each instant of time, the (present) 
state of system is a vector of present states of components. Each component transmits its 
output symbols, attributed to its present state. Thus, for any system state, the set of output 
symbols is the set union of symbols transmitted by all components in their present states. 
Therefore, in any system state some symbols are received (by all components) while other 
ones are not: this causes some transitions be enabled etc. However, some system edges 
certainly can be never enabled in a given state and they should be removed from the graph 
which represents the global system behavior.   
In the COSMA framework, the above process of elimination of such ‘void’ edges, 
calculating actual formulas and determining actually reachable states is well-defined and 
algorithmized. The algorithm is described in [27]. Starting from the initial system state, 
it computes  Boolean formulas that label all potential edges outgoing from the given system 
state and cancels all void edges.  The remaining arcs indicate system states which are actually 
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immediately reachable from the given state, then actual formulas are computed etc. The 
process continues recursively, until no new actually reachable system states are discovered.  
This way we obtain the single CSM machine which is the CSM model of joint, actual 
behavior of whole system. This machine is referred to as system's reachability graph or CSM 
product of the set of components. System reachability graph is just the model of a system. It 
makes the Kripke structure [25] necessary for the evaluation of temporal formulas. 
3 CSM MODEL OF A THREE-MODULE PIPELINE 
General functional requirements for the system have been briefly given in Section 1. The 
system (as shown in Fig. 2) provides unidirectional flow of data frames or messages, so that 
any message receives a portion of processing in a given module and then it is passed to the 
next one. Additionally, we have assumed that both Module_1 and Module_3, in order to 
perform their processing properly, have to compete (with each other and also with additional, 
unspecified counterparts) for an exclusive access to a shared resource. 
The single module is organized as in Fig. 4. While Fig. 2 illustrated schematically the flow 
of data, Fig. 4 is focused on the module components and on the flow of control among them. 
The i-th module consists of six following components: 
 Main,  the main process which controls the remaining components, 
 Rcv, the receiver responsible for obtaining messages from the left-hand neighbor, 
 Trsm, the transmitter responsible for sending messages to the right-hand neighbor, 
 Proc, the processing component responsible for i-th phase of processing, 
 InpQ, OutQ, input and output buffers of the module. 
Fig. 4. Structural diagram of a module. 1, 2, 3 – intra-module control interfaces, 4 – interface to Arbiter 
(modules 1 and 3), Prot_ i, Prot_i+1 – inter-module protocol 
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Arrows in the structural diagram indicate the communication among components. For 
instance, the arrow from Rcv to InpQ means that the component Rcv transmits (in one of its 
states) its output symbol putInpQ while InpQ has (at one of its edges) the Boolean formula 
referring to the occurrence of the same putInpQ. For the sake of readability, some groups of 
such communication dependences are replaced (in Fig. 4) by two-directional block arrows. 
The idea is explained in Fig. 5. Interactions between Main and Rcv, Main and Trsm as well as 
between Main and Proc (indicated in Fig. 4 by arrows numbered 1, 2, and 3) follow the same 
pattern, shown in the left-hand diagram of Fig. 5. In the case of interaction ‘2’, for instance, 
Main issues stRcv that starts the receiver. The Rcv has to respond with doneRcv as soon as its 
action terminates. Then, Main releases the Rcv by transmitting relRcv. 
Interactions between Trsm_i-1 and Rcv_i (inter-module protocol) also involve the 
exchange of three symbols or events, as shown in the right-hand diagram of Fig. 5. First, Rcv 
issues the symbol rdyRcv which notifies the (left-hand neighbor’s) transmitter that it is ready 
to receive. Then, Trsm transmits the message msg and waits for the acknowledgement ackRcv. 
After ackRcv the interaction terminates. 
The reader is encouraged to check how the above-mentioned behavioral requirements are 
modeled by appropriate CSM models of components. The CSM model of Main_1 is shown in 
Fig. 6. Apart from the initial Setup state, the activity of Main_1 consists in a cyclically 
Fig. 5. Sequence diagrams of intra-module control interfaces (left, ‘XX’ stands for ‘Proc’, ‘Rcv’ or ‘Trsm’), 
and inter-module protocol (right) 
 
Trsm_i-1 Rcv_i Main_i XX_i 
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doneXX_i 
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1
doneTrsm_1
! doneTrsm_1
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1
! doneRcv _1
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RelTrsm
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WtTrsm StTrsm
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Fig. 6. CSM model of Main_1 
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repeated execution of three sections: receiving the message (from StRec state up to RelRec), 
processing it (from StProc to RelProc) and transmitting it to the next module (StTrsm to 
RelTrsm).  
Fig. 7 contains the CSM models of Trsm_1 and Rcv_2, so that one can trace the 
cooperation between Main_1 (Fig. 6) and Trsm_1 (intra-module interface #3) as well as 
between Trsm_1 and Rcv_2 themselves (inter-module protocol between modules #1 and #2). 
All the components discussed by now (Main, Rcv, Trsm) are identical for all the three 
modules of the pipeline, of course except for the indices (_1, _2, _3) terminating the names of 
their input and output symbols. However, processing components (Proc_i) differ. The CSM 
model of Proc_2 was yet shown in Fig. 3. Recall that processing in modules #1 and #3 
relRcv _2
! relRcv _2
1
1
msg_2
! msg_2
stRcv _2
! stRcv _2
Wait
doneRcv _2
Conf
ackRcv _2
Write
putInpQ_2
Ready
rdy Rcv _2
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1
relTrsm_1
! relTrsm_1
! ackRcv _2
ackRcv _2
1
rdy Rcv _2
! rdy Rcv _2
stTrsm_1
! stTrsm_1
Take
getOutQ_1
Wait
doneTrsm_1
WtConf Send
msg_2
CheckNi
Fig. 7. CSM models of Trsm_1 (left) and Rcv_2 (right) 
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involves the use of common, shared resource. Therefore, they additionally have to 
communicate with Arbiter to obtain the exclusive access to it. The structural diagram of this 
part of a model is shown in Fig. 8. and the model of Proc_1 is in Fig. 9. As it can be expected, 
Proc_3 is analogous and is not shown. The Arbiter itself is shown in Fig. 10. 
The remaining system components are: input and output buffers, InpQ and OutQ. (for each 
module), message source Trsm_0 and sink Rcv_4. Their models are not shown here, 
the reader is referred to [29,30]. 
4 VERIFICATION OF THE MODEL  
Now we have the behavioral model of the same example system (CSM product of 21 
components) which has 8284 states and 34711 edges. The model have been verified in 
COSMA environment, using TempRG module [28]. The system was found incorrect, then the 
cause of an error was identified and corrected. 
To illustrate the methodology, consider the model checking of  two types of conditions: 
 safety condition (which says, informally, that the system is always in one of ‘proper’ 
states) 
 liveness condition (that from any of its states the system is always able to reach every of 
its ‘proper’ states). 
To qualify which system states are ‘proper’ ones, the following procedure has been 
applied: 
1. A desired  invariant property of system’s behavior was determined, 
2. This property was expressed in a form of an additional Concurrent State Machine, called 
Invariant, 
3. The new behavioral model has been obtained, combining in one CSM the properties of a 
system model and its invariant, 
4. The appropriate temporal formulas have been determined and evaluated in this new 
model. 
The system invariant is determined in terms of number of messages that are currently 
processed within the system. The system is data-driven pipeline, i.e. the pieces of data may be 
treated as tokens flowing through the consecutive modules. The capacity of a single module is 
one token, which follows directly form the construction of a module. So, for the whole 
system, the number of tokens (messages) processed inside may vary from zero (no messages 
relShared_3
! relShared_3
1
relShared_1
! relShared_1
1
1
1
reqAccess_1
reqAccess_3
others
! reqAccess_1 * ! reqAccess_3 * ! others
WtForRel3 GrantTo_3
grant_3
WtForRel1
GrantTo_1
grant_1
BusyIdle
Fig. 10. CSM model of Arbiter 
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inside) up to three messages. Each time the msg_1 is produced by data source – the number of 
tokens inside is incremented by one. Similarly, each time the msg_4 is produced (which 
leaves the system and is annihilated in a data sink) – the number of tokens inside the system is 
decremented by one. The automaton implementing this property is shown in Fig. 11. 
States s0 through s3 of Invariant correspond to the number of messages inside. As the 
CSM formalism allows for the simultaneous occurrence of symbols, the Boolean formulas in 
edges reflect it. For instance, if there are two messages inside (s2) and only msg_4 is 
produced, then the Invariant performs the transition to s1, but if msg_4 occurs simultaneously 
with msg_1 – then the number of messages inside is still equal to 2 and the machine remains 
in s2, etc. The Error state occurs when the system accepts a new token when three tokens are 
processed or when a token is retrieved form the empty system. Of course, if the system is 
correct, Error is never reached (safety condition).  
New system’s behavioral model, combining the system and the above invariant is a CSM 
product of {system, Invariant}, i.e. the machine system   Invariant. One can say that the 
Invariant is an additional component, which acts in parallel to the original system itself, 
‘observes’  its behavior and marks each system state with its own state.  
The property referred to above as the safety property now would say that the new system 
never visits a state with an Error in this element of state vector which corresponds to 
Invariant. This condition is expressed in QsCTL logic [25, 28] as the following temporal 
formula: 
AG  in Invariant.Error. 
The above property was evaluated true. So, the system holds it. The evaluation time was 
17 seconds on a PC computer with 800MHz processor and 512 MB of RAM. 
The liveness property says that from any system state, every ‘proper’ state of Invariant 
(i.e. states s0 thru s3) is reachable.  As on CSM systems the fairness condition is imposed 
[25], the system must actually reach every (non-Error) invariant state infinitely often. For our 
purpose it is sufficient to check if it is true that both ‘bounds’ of invariant, i.e. states s0 and 
s3, are reached infinitely often. This requirement is expressed in a form of two following 
QsCTL formulas: 
1. AG AF in Invariant.s0  
2. AG AF in Invariant.s3  
1
msg_1 * ! msg_4
! msg_1 * msg_4
msg_1 * msg_4 + ! msg_1 * ! msg_4
msg_1 * ! msg_4
! msg_1 * msg_4
msg_1 * msg_4 + ! msg_1 * ! msg_4
msg_1 * ! msg_4
! msg_1 * msg_4
msg_1 * msg_4 + ! msg_1 * ! msg_4
msg_1 * ! msg_4
! msg_1 * msg_4
msg_1 * msg_4 + ! msg_1 * ! msg_4
Error
s3s2s1s0
Fig. 11. The Invariant automaton 
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Both these formulas have been evaluated false in the model. This negative result means 
that the system may enter such a state (states) that - from this state on - the pipeline is never 
empty again (i.e. it never terminates the processing of messages) or is never able to process 
three messages at once, which it was designed for. The evaluation times were: 54 seconds for 
formula (1), and 4 min 40 seconds for formula (2). 
The model verification can be summarized as follows; 
 The system itself performs wrong: there must be a synchronization bug in the 
specification of components. This calls for the analysis of a counterexample [29,30], 
 The advantages of the evaluation algorithm used in the COSMA tool have been also 
confirmed. The algorithm terminates the evaluation as soon as the result (true, false) is 
certainly determined. It is why the evaluation times of rather similar formulas (1) and 
(2) differ by a few dozen of times. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The general message of the present paper is that the COSMA-style model checking is a 
valuable methodology that can substantially support the design process, especially at its early 
stage. The system viewed as a collection of cooperating CSM components can be treated as 
system’s preliminary behavioral specification which provides the reasonable insight into the 
cooperation of modules. Moreover, the model checking procedures can identify the possible 
synchronization pitfalls and provide the clues when such an error may occur and how one can 
modify the design to prevent it. Once this is done, the CSM specification of individual 
components can be a basis for the further refinement (also using state diagrams, sequence 
diagrams and other means supported by professional CASE tools) but the yet-identified (and 
corrected) errors do not propagate into the consecutive design stages.  
REFERENCES 
[1] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, D. A. Peled. Model Checking, MIT Press, 2000. 
[2] B. Berard (ed.) et al. Systems and Software Verification: Model-Checking Techniques 
and Tools, Springer Verlag, 2001, 
[3] http://archive.museophile.sbu.ac.uk/formal-methods.html  
[4] S. Akers. Binary Decision Diagrams, IEEE Trans. on Comp., vol. C-27, No 6 June 
1978.  
[5] R. E. Bryant. Binary Decision Diagrams: Enabling Technologies for Formal 
Verification, Proc. IEEE/ACM Int. Conf. on Computer-Aided Design, pp. 236-243, 
1995. 
[6] J. R. Burch, E. M. Clarke, K. L. and McMillan. Symbolic Model Checking: 1020 States 
and Beyond, in International Workshop on Formal Methods in VLSI Design, 1991.  
[7] E. M. Clarke, J. M. Wing. Formal methods; State of the Art. and Future Directions, 
ACM Computing Surveys, December 1996, vol. 28, nr 4, pp. 627 – 643,  
[8] T. Kropf. Introduction to Formal Hardware Verification, Springer Verlag, 1999, 
[9] D. A. Peled. Software Reliability Methods, Springer Verlag, 2001,  
Jerzy Mieścicki, Bogdan Czejdo and Wiktor B. Daszczuk 
[10] G. J. Holzmann. The Model Checker SPIN, IEEE Trans. on SE, Vol. 23, No. 5 (May 
1997), p. 279-295, 
[11] SPIN http://spinroot.com/spin/whatispin.html  
[12] K. L. McMillan. Symbolic Model Checking, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, 
[13] SMV: http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~modelcheck/smv.html 
[14] FormalCheck: www.cadence.com/datasheets/formalcheck.html 
[15] PVS: www.pvs.csl.sri.com 
[16] HOL: www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/HVG/HOL 
[17] Larch: www.larch.lcs.mit.edu 
[18] COSMA: www.ii.pw.edu.pl/cosma/ 
[19] J. Mieścicki. Concurrent system of communicating machines, Institute of Computer 
Science, WUT, Research Report 35/92, 
[20] J. Mieścicki. Boolean Formulas and the Families of Sets, Bull. Polish Ac. of Sc., Sci. Tech, 
vol. 42, No 1, 1994, 
[21] J. Mieścicki, M. Baszun, W. B.Daszczuk and B. Czejdo. Verification of Concurrent 
Engineering Software Using CSM Models, Proc.2
nd
 World Conf. on Integrated Design 
and Process Technology, IDPT’96, vol. 2, s. 322 – 330, Austin, Texas, USA, 1 - 4 Dec. 
1996, Society for Design and Process Sciences,  
[22] W. B. Daszczuk, J. Mieścicki, M. Nowacki and J. Wytrębowicz. System level 
specification and verification using Concurrent State Machines and COSMA 
environment. A case study. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference Mixed 
Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems MIXDES 2001, June 21-23, 2001, Zakopane, 
Poland, pp. 525-532.  
[23] W. B. Daszczuk, W. Grabski, J. Mieścicki and J. Wytrębowicz. System modeling in the 
COSMA environment. Proceedings Euromicro Symposium on Digital Systems Design - 
Architectures, Methods and Tools, IEEE Computer Society, September 4-6, 2001, 
Warsaw, Poland, pp. 152-157.  
[24] W. B. Daszczuk. Critical trees: counterexamples in model checking of CSM systems 
using CBS algorithm. Institute of Computer Science, WUT, Research Report 8/2002, 
Warsaw, June 2002. 
[25] W. B. Daszczuk. Verification of temporal properties in concurrent systems, Ph. D. 
Thesis, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of 
Technology, January 2003. 
[26] A. Krystosik. ECSM - Extended Concurrent State Machines. Institute of Computer 
Science, WUT, Research Report 2/2003 (in Polish), 
[27] J. Mieścicki. Concurrent State Machines, the formal framework for model-checkable 
systems, Institute of Computer Science, WUT, Research Report  5/2003,  
Jerzy Mieścicki, Bogdan Czejdo and Wiktor B. Daszczuk 
[28] W. B. Daszczuk. Temporal model checking in the COSMA environment (the operation 
of TempoRG program), Institute of Computer Science, WUT, Research Report  7/2003, 
[29] J. Mieścicki, B. Czejdo, W. B. Daszczuk. Multi-phase model checking in the COSMA 
environment  as a support for the design of pipelined processing. Institute of Computer 
Science, WUT, Research Report 16/2003.  
[30] J. Mieścicki, B. Czejdo, W. B. Daszczuk. Multi-phase model checking of a three-stage 
pipeline using the COSMA tool, Proc. European Congress on Computational Methods 
in Applied Sciences and Engineering ECCOMAS 2004, Jyväskylä, Finland, 24—28 
July 2004. 
